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Authenticity and Self-Knowledge 
Simon D. FELDMAN and Allan HAZLETT 
ABSTRACT: We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the 
value of self-knowledge.  There are a plurality of species of authenticity; 
in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (§2), 
Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (§3), existential self-knowledge (§4), and 
spontaneity (§4).  Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value 
of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of 
self-knowledge.  Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of 
(that species of) authenticity conflicts with the value of self-knowledge. 
A contemporary slogan, a favorite of self-help gurus, enjoins you to “be yourself,” 
implying the value of authenticity.  The Delphic motto, a favorite of philosophers, 
enjoins you to “know thyself,” implying the value of self-knowledge. What is the 
relationship between the value of authenticity and the value of self-knowledge?  Can the 
value of one explain the value of the other?  
“Authenticity” is ambiguous in a variety of ways: representations are said to be authentic 
when they are accurate, cuisines are said to be authentic when they resemble some 
paradigm, and people are said to be authentic when they are “true to themselves.”  It is 
this personal sense of “authentic” with which we are concerned here.   
There has recently been renewed interest in the value of knowledge and in the sources of 
epistemic normativity (Kornblith 1993, Zagzebski 1996, 2003, 2004, Sosa 2003, 2007, 
Kvanvig 2003, Grimm 2009, Greco 2010, Pritchard 2010, Hazlett 2013).  
Epistemologists have asked (among other evaluative questions): why think that 
knowledge is valuable?  What explains the value of knowledge?  Michael Lynch (2004) 
argues that the value of knowledge1 can be explained, in part, by appeal to the value of 
authenticity: for Lynch, the value of authenticity partially explains the value of self-
knowledge.  If his argument succeeds, it is important for the debate about the value of 
knowledge.   For it is widely assumed that authenticity is valuable.  As Charles Taylor 
(1991) argues, contemporary common sense conceives of the authentic life as a “better 
or higher mode of life,” and as “a standard of what we ought to desire.” (p. 16) An 
inauthentic life, on this view, is one that would be “wasted or unfulfilled.” (p. 17) If we 
can explain the value of knowledge by appeal to the value of authenticity, then, the value 
of knowledge will be based on a solid foundation.   
Even when we confine ourselves to the personal sense of “authenticity,” the term 
remains ambiguous.  There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we 
consider four species: avoiding pretense (§2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (with which 
Lynch identifies authenticity) (§3), existential self-knowledge (§4), and spontaneity (§4).  
Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity 
does not partially explain the value of self-knowledge.  Moreover, when it comes to 
spontaneity, the value of (that species of) authenticity conflicts with the value of self-
knowledge.  We conclude that Lynch’s suggestion, to explain the value of self-knowledge 
by appeal to the value of authenticity, is not promising.    
                                                 
1 Lynch’s focus is on true belief.  The differential value of knowledge and true belief is 
not our concern here and can be ignored.  We assume that true belief is a constituent of 
knowledge.   
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1 Preliminaries 
This section lays the ground for our argument, by clarifying what we mean by saying that 
there are species of authenticity (§1.1), considering the value of authenticity (§1.2), 
distinguishing between causal and constitutive accounts of the relationship between self-
knowledge and authenticity (§1.3), and distinguishing between the value of self-
knowledge and the value of self-inquiry.   
1.1 Species of authenticity 
We said that there are four species of authenticity: 
 Avoiding pretense (§2) 
 Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (§3) 
 Existential self-knowledge (§4) 
 Spontaneity (§5) 
Each of these will be explained in the relevant section, below.  By saying that there are 
species of authenticity, we mean to capture the fact that “authenticity” is ambiguous.  
When you say that someone is “authentic,” even when it is clear that you mean that she 
is true to herself, you have not yet made clear what you mean.  Our four species of 
authenticity provide possible answers to the question of what you mean when you say 
that someone is “authentic.”  
We’ve chosen to speak of “species of authenticity”; each of the four species could rightly 
be called “authenticity.”  You might choose to treat what we are calling “species” of 
authenticity as competitors for the title of genuine or real authenticity.  If you go that 
route, there will be four competing theories or conceptions of authenticity: a theory on 
which authenticity is avoiding pretense, a theory on which authenticity is Frankfurtian 
wholeheartedness, and so on.  The assumption that there are species of authenticity, 
rather than competing theories of authenticity, won’t effect our argument in this paper.  
And it is fine to speak of conceptions of authenticity, on our view, where this doesn’t 
imply competing conceptions.   
You might be skeptical of the value of some of these species of authenticity.  So, for 
example, you might wonder whether, or in what sense, it is good to be wholehearted.  
For the purposes of our argument here, we will grant the value of avoiding pretense, as 
well as the value of wholeheartedness, existential self-knowledge, and spontaneity.  If any 
of these things is not valuable, then so much the worse for the project of explaining the 
value of self-knowledge by appeal to the value of authenticity.     
Are there other species of authenticity?  If there were not, our argument would be 
stronger: we would be able to say that, for each of these species, the value of (that 
species of) authenticity does not partially explain the value of self-knowledge, and since 
there are no other species of authenticity, the value of authenticity does not partially 
explain the value of self-knowledge.  But it would be premature to preclude the 
possibility of other species of authenticity – i.e. other things that might rightly be called 
“authenticity.”  So our conclusion poses a challenge to the philosopher who would 
defend the value of self-knowledge by appeal to the value of authenticity: to articulate a 
conception of authenticity on which the value of authenticity does explain the value of 
self-knowledge.   
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1.2 The value of authenticity 
To say that x is valuable leaves open questions about the species of value x is said to 
enjoy.  If we were to explain the value of self-knowledge by appeal to the value of 
authenticity, then self-knowledge could be said to enjoy whatever species of value 
authenticity enjoys.  Lynch (2004) argues that the value of authenticity derives from its 
connection with wellbeing or the good life.  He argues (cf. §2) that self-knowledge is 
constitutive of “having a sense of self,” and that this in turn is constitutive of “self-
respect,” and that “self-respect seems to be what Rawls calls a “primary good,” or basic 
component of human happiness.” (p. 124) The value in question is “constitutive value,” 
i.e. that possessed by something in virtue of being an “essential part of something that is 
good,” e.g. “a happy flourishing life.” (p. 127) This value of authenticity is value in virtue 
of its connection with the wellbeing (happiness, the good life, flourishing) of the 
authentic person, which we’ll call eudaimonic value.  And this is the species of value 
we’ll primarily be concerned with here.2   
1.3 Causal vs. constitutive accounts 
An account of the value of self-knowledge that appeals to the value of authenticity must 
maintain some connection between self-knowledge and authenticity.  We need to 
distinguish between two kinds of account.  On a constitutive account of the 
connection between authenticity and self-knowledge, self-knowledge is (at least) a part of 
authenticity.  On the assumption that authenticity is finally valuable (i.e. valuable for its 
own sake), it could then be argued that self-knowledge is finally valuable as well, in as 
much as it is (at least) a partial constituent of something finally valuable (namely, 
authenticity).  On a causal account of the connection between authenticity and self-
knowledge, self-knowledge (generally, typically, normally) causes authenticity.  It could 
then be argued that self-knowledge is instrumentally valuable vis-à-vis the (distinct) end 
of authenticity.  
1.4 Self-knowledge vs. self-inquiry 
We can distinguish between the value of knowledge and the value of inquiry.  In general, 
if it is valuable to know whether p, then it will be valuable to inquire about whether p, in 
virtue of the fact that inquiry is a means to the end of knowledge.  But the relationship 
between the value of knowledge and the value of inquiry is complex.  The disvalue of 
inquiry about whether p might trump the value of knowing whether p, as when acquiring 
knowledge about some question is not worth the cost of inquiry about that question.  
And there might be species of inquiry that are valuable, independent of their status as 
means to the end of knowledge; inquiry itself, you might think, is sometimes valuable for 
its own sake.   
However, we shall assume that maintaining the value of self-knowledge commits one to 
the value of self-inquiry, i.e. inquiry aimed at acquiring self-knowledge.  Maintaining the 
value of x does not always commit one to the value of seeking x.  There might be 
(economically) valuable gold in the hills, but seeking said gold might be (economically) 
disvaluable, because of the costs of extracting it.  Someone could consistently defend the 
                                                 
2 We have argued (2013, §5) that inauthenticity is sometimes morally problematic 
because it sometimes involves lying to or misleading other people (cf. Trilling 1972, pp. 
3-6).  The arguments of this paper could be advanced, with moral value in the place of 
eudaimonic value.  See also Feldman forthcoming. 
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value of self-knowledge, but advise against the policy of seeking self-knowledge and thus 
reject the value of self-inquiry.  But this would be a curious position.  The affirmation of 
the value of self-knowledge would provide no advice or guidance.  Most philosophers 
who would defend the value of self-knowledge seek to explain, by appeal to the value of 
self-knowledge, the value of such knowledge-directed intellectual virtues as 
inquisitiveness, curiosity, intellectual honesty, intellectual integrity, and so on.  And as the 
compelling prescription of the Delphic motto suggests, it is natural for those who value 
self-knowledge to value self-inquiry.  So we assume that maintaining the value of self-
knowledge commits one to the value of self-inquiry.   
Our focus in this paper will be on connections between authenticity and self-knowledge, 
but when self-inquiry is relevant – in particular, when there are potential conflicts 
between authenticity and self-inquiry (§2.2, §5.2) – we will discuss self-inquiry.   
2 Authenticity as avoiding pretense 
To be authentic is to be true to yourself.  What does it mean to be “true to yourself”?  
One possible answer is that to be authentic is to avoid pretense, and thus that a person is 
authentic just to the extent that she avoids pretense.3  Consider David Velleman’s (2002) 
“paradigm case of inauthenticity”: the poseur who “in general conforms himself to the 
demands and expectations of others.” (p. 97) The authentic person, by contrast, does not 
conform to the demands and expectations of others; rather, she conforms to her own 
demands and expectations: she acts as she wants to act, not as other people want her to 
act.  So authenticity, on this conception, amounts to avoiding pretense, and the relevant 
species of self-knowledge is knowledge of your own desires.  In this section we argue 
that, on this conception, there is no plausible connection between self-knowledge and 
authenticity.  
2.1  Self-knowledge and avoiding pretense 
While it might be the case that conforming to the demands and expectations of others 
requires knowing what those demands and expectations are, this is not the case when it 
comes to conforming to your own demands and expectations.  To act as other people 
want you to act, you must first know how other people want you to act; but to act as you 
want to act, you need not know how you want yourself to act, because your own desires, 
unlike the desires of other people, can motivate action without your knowing that they 
are your desires.4  Knowledge of others is required to be a poseur, but knowledge of 
yourself is not required simply to be yourself.  So self-knowledge is, at least, not a 
constituent of avoiding pretense.5 
However, might we conceive of authenticity as avoiding pretense, and offer a causal 
account of the connection between authenticity and self-knowledge?  Granted that 
knowledge of what you want is not required for avoiding pretense, you might still argue 
that knowledge of what you want is a generally reliable means of making it the case that 
you avoid pretense.   
                                                 
3 See Feldman and Hazlett 2013, §2 and §5.   
4 We assume here, and in what follows, that it is characteristic of desires that they 
motivate action.  See footnote 11.   
5 In more metaphorical language, someone’s actions might be expressions of her “true 
self,” or who she “really” is, even if she does not know her “true self,” or who she “really” 
is. 
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Such self-knowledge is not the only reliable means of avoiding pretense.  A naïve person, 
uncorrupted by social expectations, might be authentic, in this sense, without any self-
knowledge about her desires.  Reliable authenticity without self-knowledge seems 
possible.  But, still, perhaps knowing what you want is more reliable, in general, than not 
knowing what you want, when it comes to bringing about the goal of avoiding pretense. 
But why think that this is the case?  In general, and in the paradigmatic case of action 
that is based on desire, action is caused by desire, not by knowledge of desire.  I want 
nourishment, I know that eating this bread will bring nourishment, and so I eat this 
bread.  That’s the paradigm case.  Knowledge that I want nourishment isn’t necessary to 
bring about my action, for two reasons.  First, I might eat without knowing that I want 
nourishment, in the event that I am unreflective and not thinking about my own desires, 
while I eat.  Second, such knowledge seems causally irrelevant to the action I perform: a 
desire for nourishment, coupled with knowledge that eating will bring nourishment, is 
enough to explain the fact that I eat, even if I do happen to know that I want 
nourishment.  We conclude that there is no close connection between knowledge of your 
desires and avoiding pretense. 
We can be mislead into thinking that knowing what we want is more reliable, in general, 
than not knowing what we want, when it comes to bringing about the goal of avoiding 
pretense, by thinking about authenticity in terms of the “true self.”6  On this picture, two 
sorts of desires compete to bring about your actions: those of your “true self” and those 
of other people (“the demands and expectations of others”) or of various “false selves,” 
i.e. inauthentic identities that you am tempted to pretend to be.  Think here of the idea of 
discovering “who you really are.”  This can suggest a picture on which there is a 
distinction between who you “really” are and who you actually are, and thus between 
your “real” desires and those that you actually have.  Once this picture is adopted, the 
need for self-knowledge seems obvious.  Because your “real” desires may not be desires 
that you actually have, they cannot be expected to bring about action in the manner of 
actual desires, where (as we argued above) in the paradigm case desire brings about 
action without knowledge of desire.  It seems then that the only way to bring it about 
that your actions reflect your “real” desires is to become aware of them.  Whereas in the 
paradigm case desire (for nourishment) and belief (that eating will bring nourishment) 
conspire to produce action, in the ideal case (on the present proposal), knowledge of 
“real” desire (i.e. for what my “true self” wants) and belief (about how to obtain what my 
“true self” wants) will conspire to produce action.  The motivational efficacy of your 
actual desires does not depend on whether you know about them or not, but the 
motivational efficacy of your “real” desires does so depend.   
But we should not adopt this misleading picture, with its metaphysically dubious notion 
of the “true self,” with its “real” desires.  There may be something to these distinctions, 
but the language of the “true self” is metaphorical, at best.  Can we cash out this 
metaphor in non-metaphorical terms?     
One possibility is that talking about your “real” desires and your actual desires is just a 
metaphorical way of talking about your desires and the desires of other people, as 
suggested by Velleman’s case of the poseur.  But, as we argued above, there is no reason 
to think that there is a connection between knowing about your desires and being 
                                                 
6 This picture is not explicitly defended in the philosophical literature, but figures 
prominently in non-academic thinking about authenticity.   
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influenced by your desires, whereas it is plausible that there is a connection between 
knowing about other people’s desires and being influenced by other people’s desires.     
Another possibility is that talk of “true selves” is actually talk of “ideal selves” (cf. 
Frankfurt 1988, pp. 63-4) or simply of better selves, so that when we speak of my “real” 
desires as opposed to my actual desires, we simply mean the desires that I would have, 
were I a better person (along some dimension), as opposed to the desires that I actually 
have, in my present flawed state.  Think of an addict who wants to smoke cigarettes but 
also wants to quit smoking.  She might articulate her situation by saying that she does not 
“really” want to smoke, or that her “true self” does not want to smoke.  We’ll have more 
to say about this kind of case, below (§3), but the language of “real” desires and “true 
selves” is misleading in this case: a more perspicuous account would simply say that the 
addict wants to smoke, but thinks (or knows) that it would be better for her if she did 
not want to smoke.  But if we articulate the notion of “real” desires or of the “true self” 
in this way, then these notions can’t be used to plausibly define a species of authenticity.  It 
would be better for the addict if she did not want to smoke.  But that is orthogonal to 
the question of whether she would be more authentic, more true to herself, if she did not 
want to smoke.  
A third possibility is that the distinction between “real” and actual desires can be 
articulated in terms of “wholeheartedness”; we’ll consider this idea below (§3).   
2.2  Self-inquiry and the “true self” 
In the absence of some reason to posit a connection between knowledge of your desires 
and avoiding pretense (§2.1), we have no reason to think that there would be a 
connection between inquiry about your desires and avoiding pretense.  Indeed, as we 
shall argue, there are reasons to think that self-inquiry can be unreliable vis-à-vis the goal 
of authenticity, at least when one adopts the language of “true” and “false” selves.7  The 
species of self-inquiry relevant to authenticity, on this conception, will be inquiry that 
seeks knowledge of your “true self.”   
On the conception of the “true self” we discussed above (§2.1), your actual self is 
inauthentic, and the quest for authenticity requires finding your “true self.”  There is an 
alternative conception, on which your “true self” is who you actually are, and the 
preservation of authenticity requires avoiding “false selves.”  We’ll consider this 
alternative conception first, and then return to the previous conception.   
On the alternative conception, the worry that arises in connection with self-inquiry is 
that we are prone to error when it comes to distinguishing our “true self” from various 
“false selves.”  It is easy for a poseur to think that she is being true to herself, and, even 
more importantly, it is easy for a perfectly authentic person to think that she is a poseur.  
Seeking knowledge of who you “really are” can easily precipitate a crisis of identity; the 
problem with such crises is that they can just as easily result in your coming falsely to 
believe that your actual self is an inauthentic performance, or that some pretense reflects 
your “true self,” than in your arriving at self-knowledge.  It isn’t just that inquiry is 
                                                 
7 Compare Sarah Broadie (1994): “[R]eflection might be positively harmful, for once we 
start to think and to discuss the good, we can make intellectual mistakes about it and be 
led off the right practical track. It may be that for fallible human beings ethical self‐
reflection is a luxury which we cannot safely afford.” (p. 5) 
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fallible: it’s that a particular species of inquiry, namely, inquiry about one’s “true self,” is 
not only fallible but, at least in many cases, unreliable.8   
Over and above these epistemic worries, self-inquiry of this kind also has the potential to 
change the object at which it is directed in negative ways.  Inquiry about who we “really 
are” often leads to doubt and skepticism about whether our actual self is a “false self,” 
about whether what feels most authentic to us is in fact an elaborate pretense.  Such 
doubt can transform an intuitively authentic person into a person wracked with self-
doubt and confusion about “who she really is.”  Think here of the teenager’s “existential 
crisis.”  Perhaps such eudaimonic costs are the wages of epistemic virtue, to the extent 
that self-knowledge is risky vis-à-vis authenticity, but we sought to explain the value of 
self-knowledge by appeal to the value of authenticity.  If the present argument is sound, 
the value of authenticity doesn’t explain the value of self-knowledge.       
Let’s return to the previous conception of the “true self,” on which your actual self is not 
your “true self.”  The same kind of worry applies here: we are prone to error when we 
seek knowledge of who we “really are.”  It is all too easy to become convinced that a 
particular project or lifestyle or set of values reflects your “true self.”  The difficulty here 
flows from the present conception of the relationship between your actual self and your 
“true self”: you can’t find out who you really are by introspection or by reflecting on 
your behavior, because your actual self isn’t your “true self.”  Inquiry about who we 
“really are,” on the present conception, can be unreliable as a result of the fact that we 
are unable to rely on these traditional sources of self-knowledge, and as such we are left 
open to wishful thinking and the suggestions of charismatic gurus.  And the metaphysical 
obscurity of the “true self,” on this conception (§2.1), is at least one source of these 
epistemological problems.9      
Again, we can be changed in negative ways by inquiry about our “true selves.”  On the 
present conception of the relationship between the actual self and the “true self,” the 
worry is that inquiry about who we really are can lead to pretense.  Think here of a 
wealthy bohemian, who mimics poverty as a result of self-inquiry, taking herself to have 
finally discovered her “true self.” 
We are not here challenging the idea that self-inquiry might often lead to knowledge of 
one’s “true self.”  What we have argued is that self-inquiry can be unreliable vis-à-vis 
such knowledge.  The connection between self-inquiry and authenticity is obscure.  
3  Authenticity as wholeheartedness 
Michael Lynch (2004) writes: 
[T]o live an authentic life, you must identify with those desires that 
effectively guide your action.  You identify with a desire when it 
                                                 
8 In this section (and in §5.4) we appeal to contingent premises about human psychology.  
These premises could therefore be challenged by appeal to empirical evidence.  In the 
absence of any such evidence, however, we see no reason to doubt these intuitive 
premises.   
9 For the purposes of this paper, we set aside the question of whether knowledge of “true 
self” is possible.  If it is not, then the value of such self-knowledge seems doubtful (cf. 
§1.4).  To the extent that such knowledge is possible, our view is that self-inquiry is an 
unreliable means to knowledge of “true self.”  
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reflects the kind of person you wish to be, what you care about. […] 
I am … true to myself … when I identify with my effective desires.  
When I do, I can then be … “wholehearted” in my commitment to 
my actions. (p. 125) 
This notion of wholeheartedness derives from the work of Harry Frankfurt (1988, 1998, 
2004).  It is designed to provide a non-metaphorical and rigorous articulation of some of 
the intuitive ideas that might be expressed by talking about your “real” desires or your 
“true self.” (§1) Following Lynch, we’ll ignore a few subtleties of Frankfurt’s views here, 
in favor of simpler articulations of these notions, but what we say can be applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to Frankfurt’s more elaborate conceptions of wholeheartedness and caring.   
So, for Lynch, a person is authentic to the extent that she is wholehearted.  More exactly, 
you are authentic to the extent that your actions are authentic, and your actions are 
authentic to the extent that you are wholehearted in performing them.  You are 
wholehearted in performing some action when you identify with the desires that move 
you to act.  You are inauthentic to the extent that you are moved to act by desires with 
which you do not identify.  
What is identification?  It is difficult to provide an adequate definition (cf. Frankfurt 
1988, Chapter 5), although the notion has some intuitive appeal: to identify with a desire 
is to endorse or accept or embrace it; it is incompatible with being alienated from that 
desire as something “external”; it is a matter of taking the desire to be “really” yours.10  
For our purposes here we can avoid the controversial question of the nature of 
identification, by following Frankfurt and Lynch in taking identification to have a 
constitutive connection to caring.  We shall assume the following: that S’s desire to  
constitutes an instance of caring iff S identifies with her desire to  (cf. Frankfurt 1998, 
p. 160-1).11  Given this conception of caring, we can re-state Lynch’s account of 
authenticity without using the notion of identification: you are authentic to the extent 
that your actions are authentic, and your actions are authentic to the extent that you are 
moved to act by what you care about; and you are inauthentic to the extent that you are 
moved to act by desires that do not constitute instances of caring.   
                                                 
10 According to a simple passive account of identification, a person identifies with her 
desire to  iff she desires that she desire to .  Frankfurt argues that this account is 
inadequate: identification requires more than a (passive) higher-order attitude, it requires 
something active.  “[B]y making a certain kind of decision,” Frankfurt writes, “the relation 
of the person to his passions is established.” (1988, p. 68, my emphasis) Identification is 
something that a person does, on this view, and is not merely a matter of a person’s 
conative states.  When someone identifies with some desire of his, he will “make up his 
mind” about which of his desires he sides with (1988, p. 174).  The notion of actively 
“making up one’s mind” would need to be spelled out further, but once this is done, we 
would have an active account of identification.   
11 We assume no theory of desire, nor any claim about its direction of fit.  We make two 
assumptions about desire (and thus about caring).  First, we assume that it is possible, 
and indeed not abnormal or atypical, for someone to desire to  without knowing that 
she desires to .  Second, we assume that desire is characteristically manifested in action 
– i.e. that desires are motivational states – but leave open the question of the extent to 
which this exhausts or is part of the essence of desire.   
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Given this conception of authenticity, is there any connection, either constitutive or 
causal, between self-knowledge and authenticity?  The relevant species of self-knowledge 
here is knowledge of what I care about; complete self-knowledge, of the relevant species, 
would be knowledge that I care about x, for all x that I care about.  In this section we 
criticize Lynch’s constitutive account of the connection between authenticity and self-
knowledge (§3.1), and then argue that a causal account is not plausible (§3.2).   
3.1 Lynch’s constitutive account 
Lynch (2004) argues that a species of self-knowledge is valuable because it is partly 
constitutive of authenticity, which in turn is partly constitutive of wellbeing.  “[N]ot only 
does life go better when you care about something,” argues Lynch, “you also need to 
know that you do.” (p. 126) The person who does not know what he cares about “must 
– to some extent – lack control over himself.” (Ibid.) So, the argument goes, “[i]f you 
don’t know which of your possibly conflicting desires you identify with, you cannot be 
acting authentically.” (Ibid.) And thus “knowing what matters to you is partly 
constitutive of authenticity.” (Ibid.) Given this conception of the relationship between 
authenticity and self-knowledge, and assuming the value of authenticity (understood as 
wholehearted action), we can explain the value of self-knowledge.  Authenticity is 
valuable, self-knowledge is partly constitutive of authenticity, therefore self-knowledge is 
valuable.12 
We’ll argue that Lynch’s account of the value of self-knowledge fails.  Wholeheartedness 
– i.e. identification with those desires that do move you to act, i.e. being moved to act by 
what you care about – does not require knowledge of what you care about, and is 
therefore not partly constituted by knowledge of what you care about.13  To put this 
point another way, and as Frankfurt makes clear (1988, p. 162), it is easy to care about 
something without knowing that you care about it.  Consider someone who does not 
know that she cares about etiquette.  She may even believe that she doesn’t care about 
etiquette.  However, violations of etiquette make her uncomfortable, and she resents 
people who are knowingly impolite.  Reflection on this might make her realize that she 
cares about etiquette.   
Indeed, it is easy to be moved to act by what you care about, even when you’re ignorant 
of what you care about: imagine following the Boston Celtics progress over the course of 
a season with what you took to be indifference; but when the Celtics win the NBA Finals 
you are elated and jump up out of your seat. Up to this point you did not realize that you 
cared about basketball.14  Your action – jumping up out of your seat – is motivated by 
what you care about, but not by something you know you care about.  Your jumping out 
                                                 
12 Lynch’s argument assumes that the parts of a valuable whole are themselves valuable.  
This assumption could be challenged, but we grant it for the sake of argument.   
13 In other words, identification does not require knowledge of identification.  We leave 
open the question of whether identification, on the active account, requires cognition of 
some kind or other.  Frankfurt suggests that it doesn’t: in ambivalence “what is divided is 
neither a person’s reason nor his affects, but his will.” (1998, p. 98-9) 
14 We do not mean to imply that the fan’s behavior, in this instance, is conclusive 
evidence that she cares about basketball.   
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of your seat is wholehearted, but you lack self-knowledge.  And, intuitively, this is a case 
of authentic action without self-knowledge.15   
Cases of rational akrasia (Audi 1990, Arpaly 2003) can be cases of wholeheartedness 
without self-knowledge.  Oliver Single (Arpaly 2003, pp. 3-8, from John LeCarré’s novel 
Single and Single) is torn between conscience and loyalty: his father’s firm is involved in 
organized crime, and he has the opportunity – which his conscience tells him he ought to 
take – to defect to the side of the law.  When it comes time to defect, Single acts with 
alienation: he reaches for the telephone, preparing to betray his father, but “his arm 
reaches out for it unbidden, his hand grasps it and puts it to his ear, leaving him with the 
responsibility of what to say.” (p. 4) Single does not know what he cares about, for he 
does not know whether his conscience or his loyalty will move him to act: “Something 
amazing is about to happen to him and he is eager to find out what it will be.” (Ibid.) 
Single’s action allows him to learn what he cares about: moral principle, rather than 
familial loyalty.  Or, alternatively, we might also imagine a version of Oliver Single where 
Single isn’t akratic but rather, where, antecedent to his reaching for the phone, there is 
no fact of the matter about what he cares about. In reaching for the phone he settles what 
he cares about (thus “making up his mind”), though he may only ever realize that he has 
done so in hindsight.  In both scenarios, Single does not know, when he reaches for the 
phone, that moral principle is what he cares about, but that is what moves him to act.  
His action is wholehearted, but Single doesn’t know what he cares about.  Again, these 
are, intuitively, cases of authentic action without self-knowledge.   
To sum up, wholeheartedness is not partly constituted by self-knowledge (of what you 
care about).  And thus if authenticity is identified with wholehearted action, authenticity 
is not partly constituted by self-knowledge, and Lynch’s argument is unsound.   
Perhaps caring always involves at least implicit self-knowledge.  Bennett Helm (2001) 
argues that “valuing something and so identifying with it just means finding it to be 
central to the kind of person it is worth one’s being,” (p. 105) and thus caring16 requires 
“an understanding of the kind of person one finds worth being,” (p. 101) i.e. a species of 
self-knowledge.  But this self-knowledge need not be conscious or explicit.  Helm asks us 
to consider the case of Betty (pp. 102-3), a devoted and subservient housewife who has 
internalized the value of subordination to the needs of others, such that she finds 
anything other than such subordination shameful.  Helm argues that: 
[I]t would seem unnecessary to require that Betty has explicitly thought 
the matter through and self-consciously endorsed this subservient role as 
part of her identity in order for her to value it [i.e. care about it].  Rather 
… we can make sense of the self-understanding [required for caring], the 
concern with herself and her motives for action, to be implicit in her felt 
evaluations. (p. 103) 
                                                 
15 We deny that authenticity, understood as wholehearted action, requires knowledge of 
what you care about.  We do not deny that authenticity sometimes manifests knowledge 
(even self-knowledge).  For example, the action of the basketball fan (above) manifests 
her knowledge that the Celtics won the Finals.  Moreover, the resentment of the person 
who cares about etiquette (above) manifests her knowledge that the rules of etiquette 
have been broken.    
16 Helm uses “valuing” here, but he means what we mean by “caring”; for him “caring” 
does not require identification (2001, pp. 100-1).     
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We agree that caring does not require conscious or explicit self-knowledge.  But we 
disagree that “self-understanding” is always implicit in “the projectible, rational patterns 
of reflexive felt evaluations constitutive of one’s values.” (p. 105) To see this, consider 
paradigm cases of tacit knowledge.  In such cases we feel compelled to posit tacit 
knowledge, in order to explain some actions, cognitions, or emotions of some agent.  
Consider someone who unreflectively navigates the streets of her native city, without 
consciously or explicitly representing its geography; given her ability to navigate, we feel 
compelled to posit implicit knowledge of the city’s geography.  And just as knowing can 
be implicit, caring – in our sense, where this does not require self-knowledge – can be 
implicit.  In the case of the person who (unknowingly) cares about etiquette, given her 
emotional responses to violations of etiquette, we feel compelled to posit implicit caring 
about etiquette; in the case of the person who (unknowingly) cares about basketball, 
given her emotional response to the Celtics’ win, we feel compelled to posit implicit 
caring about basketball.  In exactly the same way, given Betty’s negative emotional 
response to the idea of insubordination, we feel compelled to posit implicit care for her 
subordinate role.  But there is no felt compulsion to posit implicit self-knowledge, in 
Betty’s case (nor is there in the etiquette and basketball cases).  We needed to posit 
implicit knowledge, in the geography case, because we would be unable to explain the 
agent’s actions otherwise – how is she able to navigate, without some implicit 
representation of the layout of the city?  But in Betty’s case, there is no need to posit 
implicit self-understanding (i.e. knowledge of that fact that her subordinate role is central 
to her self-worth) to explain her pattern of emotional responses, since this pattern is 
sufficiently explained by her implicit care (in our sense) for her subordinate role.  There 
is no need to posit, in addition to such implicit care (in our sense), the kind of self-
understanding that Helm suggests is required for caring.17  Caring, therefore, does not 
require self-knowledge: it is possible for some value to be central to the kind of person it 
is worth one’s being, without one finding that value to be thus central. 
To make better sense of Lynch’s argument, we might consider alternative conceptions of 
identification and wholeheartedness.  We might say that a person self-consciously 
identifies with her desire to  iff she identifies with her desire to  and knows that she 
so identifies.  Wholeheartedness defined in terms of self-conscious identification is self-
conscious wholeheartedness.  Note that self-conscious wholeheartedness entails 
wholeheartedness, and that self-knowledge is partly constitutive of self-conscious 
wholeheartedness.   
Above, following Frankfurt, we identified caring with having a desire with which you 
identify.  It is not plausible to identify caring with having a desire with which you self-
consciously identify.  This is because, as we noted above, you can care about something 
without knowing that you care about it.  If caring required self-conscious identification, 
then it would difficult to care about something without knowing that you care about it.   
Why think that self-conscious wholeheartedness is eudaimonically valuable?  If 
authenticity is identified with self-conscious wholeheartedness, why think that 
                                                 
17 As noted above, we merely deny that authenticity requires knowledge of what you care 
about.  As with the etiquette and basketball cases (above), authenticity may manifest self-
knowledge: Betty’s shame, for example, might manifest her knowledge that she has 
violated a social norm of submissiveness.  What we deny is that her shame (and the rest 
of her pattern of emotional response) necessarily manifests knowledge that she cares 
about said social norm. 
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authenticity is eudaimonically valuable?  In particular, why think that self-conscious 
wholeheartedness is eudaimonically valuable over and above mere wholeheartedness, 
given that self-conscious wholeheartedness entails mere wholeheartedness?  This would 
not be a problem were we not attempting to explain the value of self-knowledge.  On the 
one hand, suppose that self-conscious wholeheartedness is no more eudaimonically 
valuable than mere wholeheartedness.  Then the addition of self-knowledge has added 
nothing of value.  On the other hand, suppose that self-conscious wholeheartedness is 
more eudaimonically valuable than mere wholeheartedness.  Why is this the case?  If we 
assume the additional value of self-conscious wholeheartedness, then we will have done 
nothing to explain the value of self-knowledge.  What is needed is an account of the 
additional value of self-conscious wholeheartedness, over and above that of mere 
wholeheartedness.   
Lynch provides a clue for how to develop such an account, in the idea that inauthentic 
actions involve a lack of self-control (p. 126).  We shall assume here that a person acts 
authentically when she is moved to act by desires with which she self-consciously 
identifies, and that she acts inauthentically otherwise.  There are therefore two ways a 
person can act inauthentically: she may be moved to act by a desire D with which she 
does not identify, or she may be moved to act by a desire D with which she does identify, 
but where she does not know that she identifies with D.  In other words, a person’s 
actions may be inauthentic because her actions are not wholehearted, and therefore not 
self-consciously wholehearted, or they may be inauthentic because they are wholehearted, 
but not self-consciously wholehearted.  Lynch’s argument then requires two premises: (i) 
that a person has self-control only if her actions are authentic, and (ii) that self-control is 
eudaimonicly valuable.  For the purposes of our critique, we shall take premise (i) as a 
stipulation about a certain species of self-control.  Our question, then, is whether 
premise (ii) is true.   
Lynch defends the value of self-control by comparing inauthenticity to “not knowing at 
which stop you should get off a train”: 
You realize that one of the stops is where you are going, the one that is 
important to you.  But since you don’t know which one that is, every stop 
becomes equally important or unimportant. […] If you don’t know what 
you care about, you must either choose something and act as if you care 
about it, or simply remain adrift in indecision.  In neither case are you in 
control, and in neither case can your actions intuitively be said to be 
authentic expressions of what matters most to you. (p. 126) 
However, Lynch’s analogy doesn’t work.  What is bad about not knowing where to get 
off the train is that you are likely to miss your stop: if you ignorantly choose to alight, 
you are likely to alight at the wrong stop; if you ignorantly choose to remain on the train, 
you are likely to miss your stop.  Consider the person whose actions are wholehearted, 
but not self-consciously wholehearted.  She cares about certain people, projects, and 
ideals, and she is moved to act by those cares.  Her actions are consistently and 
systematically performed in the service of the people, projects, and ideals that she cares 
about.  She is not at all like the ignorant train passenger, who runs a great risk of failing 
to alight at the proper stop.  The merely wholehearted person is more like a train 
passenger who is unaware that she knows which stop is hers, but who nevertheless will, 
or is likely to, get off at the right stop.  She is like someone whose instincts guide her 
actions, while she remains ignorant that her actions are so guided.  Think here of the 
amnesiac Jason Bourne, who knows how to fight, but does not know that he knows how 
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to fight.  When the time comes to fight, he doesn’t “remain adrift in indecision,” but 
rather fights with brutal effectiveness.  His actions are inauthentic, in the present sense, 
but what’s bad about such inauthenticity?  Not, we submit, the fact that Bourne’s actions 
are ineffectual or incompetent, like those of someone who does not know which stop is 
hers on the train.   
Consider, again, Oliver Single.  By hypothesis, he lacks self-conscious wholeheartedness; 
he does not know what he cares about.  Is Single’s action an expression of what matters 
most to him?  We imagined that Single is wholehearted: moral principle is what he cares 
about, not family loyalty.  But in this case, his action is an expression of what matters 
most to him.  What matters most to him, he has discovered, is moral principle.  Single 
was moved to act by what he cared about.  He just did not know, in advance of his 
action, what he cared about.  Lynch claims that the inauthentic person must either act in 
bad faith, by pretending to care about something, or else “remain adrift in indecision.”  
But the person who lacks self-conscious wholeheartedness need not lack 
wholeheartedness: she may care about certain people, projects, and ideals, and those 
cares may move her to act, even while she lacks knowledge of what she cares about.   
We have failed to find an account of the additional value of self-conscious 
wholeheartedness, over and above that of mere wholeheartedness.  We have therefore 
failed to find an explanation of the value of self-knowledge that appeals to the value of 
authenticity.   
3.2 A causal account 
For Lynch (2004), the relationship between self-knowledge and authenticity is 
constitutive (p. 123 and passim), but we could conceive of the relationship between self-
knowledge and authenticity as causal (§1.3).  Let’s continue to assume a conception of 
authenticity on which for your actions to be authentic is for you to moved to act by, and 
only by, what you care about.  We might then argue that a generally reliable means of 
making it the case that you are moved to act by what you care about is to know what you 
care about.  In other words, we might argue that knowing what you care about is a 
generally reliable means of making it the case that your actions are authentic.   
You do not need to know what you care about to be moved to act by what you care 
about.  That was the point of the case of the unknowing basketball fan and the case of 
Oliver Single.  Caring is a species of desiring, and desires can motivate action regardless 
of whether you are aware of them.  So knowing what you care about is not required for 
being moved to act by what you care about.  Moreover, such cases do not strike us as 
particularly rare or unusual.  So it is not the case that, in general, you must know what 
you care about to be moved to act by what you care about.  Moreover, knowing that you 
don’t care about something is no guarantee that you will not be moved to act by your 
desire for that thing: even though you are alienated from your desire to smoke, i.e. even 
though you know that you do not care about smoking, you still smoke.  And knowing 
that you care about something is no guarantee against akrasia: you know that you care 
about your health, but you can’t resist the lure of a double cheeseburger.  So it is not the 
case that, in general, knowing what you care about keeps you from being moved to act 
by desires that do not amount to cares.     
When it comes to the question of the value of self-knowledge, we must ask whether 
knowing what you care about is more reliable, vis-à-vis the goal of authentic action, than 
not knowing what you care about.  This depends on whether knowing what you care 
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about improves your chances of being moved to act by what you care about, over and 
above your chances of being so moved in ignorance of what you care about.  And this 
hinges on (i) whether you are more likely to be moved to act by something that you 
know you care about, than by something that you merely care about, and (ii) whether you 
are more likely not to be moved to act by something that you desire but know you don’t 
care about, than by something that you desire but merely don’t care about.   
It is tempting to think that someone who does not know what she cares about will not 
know what to do, either in general or in specific circumstances.  Self-ignorance, it seems, 
will lead to practical ignorance, and so practical knowledge will require self-knowledge.  
In one sense this is right.  Suppose that someone “knows what to do” iff, for some , 
she knows that she cares about X and that ing is suitable given the importance of X.  
On that conception of “knowing what to do,” knowing what you care about would be 
useful, if not essential, for knowing what to do.  But this is a narrow, intellectual 
conception of “knowing what to do.”  Someone could easily not “know what to do,” in 
this sense, and still reliably act it ways that are suitable, given what she cares about.  
When we imagine someone who doesn’t know what to do, we imagine someone 
confused, torn between various options, or “adrift in indecision,” someone who is an 
ineffective and unreliable agent.  The relationship between self-knowledge and avoiding 
that sort of practical ignorance is obscure. 
Caring is a species of desiring, and desires are essentially motivationally efficacious.  Our 
question is whether known desires have enhanced motivationally efficacy, over and 
above the efficacy already present.  We have failed to find any answer to this question a 
priori.  Reliable connections between self-knowledge and practical knowledge, if they 
exist, might be defended on empirical grounds, where we might discover individual 
differences: self-knowledge might improve authentic action in some people but not in 
others, and people might differ in their ability to act authentically in the absence of self-
knowledge.  In the absence of such empirical study, the connection between self-
knowledge and wholehearted action remains unclear.  
4  Authenticity as existential self-knowledge 
For Lynch, authenticity has a cognitive component.  But given his conception of 
authenticity, we failed to find a plausible account of the value of self-knowledge.  There 
is a conception of authenticity on which authenticity seems to be almost entirely cognitive, 
one on which a species of self-knowledge not only partially but wholly constitutes 
authenticity.  Existentialist philosophers describe “bad faith” as a species of self-
deception in which a person refuses to acknowledge her dual nature as both an objective 
facticity and a subjective transcendence (Beauvoir 1948, Sartre 1956, 2007).  “Good faith,” 
or authenticity, would require honest acceptance of your human condition – i.e. 
conscious knowledge of your dual nature, without self-deception.  So a third possible 
answer to our question about the nature of authenticity is that a person is authentic just 
to the extent that she acknowledges her human condition.   
The constitutive connection between authenticity and self-knowledge, on this view, is 
straightforward: the relevant species of self-knowledge is acknowledgement of your 
human condition, which is both necessary and sufficient for authenticity.  Given this 
conception of authenticity, does the value of authenticity explain the value of self-
knowledge?  No.  Authenticity, on the present conception, just is a species of self-
knowledge.  We cannot explain the value of the latter in terms of the former.  Indeed, the 
appeal of authenticity, on the existentialist conception, lies principally in the fact that it is 
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a species of self-knowledge.  It is not that knowledge of your human condition is 
appealing because this is required for authenticity, on the existentialist conception, but 
rather that authenticity, on this conception, is appealing because it requires a difficult-to-
acquire item of self-knowledge.   
This account of the appeal of existentialist authenticity can be broadened to include the 
appeal of other species of authenticity.  Consider someone who seems paradigmatically 
inauthentic: the internalized poseur.  The ordinary poseur (§3) pretends to care about 
something that she knows she doesn’t care about, or pretends not to care about 
something that she knows she cares about.  For example, she doesn’t care about 
basketball, and knows that she doesn’t care about basketball, but pretends to like 
basketball, in order to fit in with her friends.  The internalized poseur has taken this 
artifice one step further: she has convinced herself, or has become confused to the point 
that she now believes, that she cares about basketball.  She jumps out of her seat, shouts 
with what strikes us as feigned excitement, cringes when her “favorite” team loses – but 
this all seems to us to be a performance, a sham.  Even if she now thinks that she loves 
basketball, “deep down” she really doesn’t. 
Now part of what is especially irritating about the internalized poseur, we submit, is her 
lack of self-knowledge, and in particular her ignorance of what she cares about.  Her 
inauthenticity is of a more annoying variety precisely because of the way in which she 
differs from the ordinary poseur.  The ordinary poseur is knowingly and deliberately 
putting on a performance; the internalized poseur is putting on a performance without 
even knowing that she is putting on a performance.  Indeed, once this is recognized, you 
might reconsider your intuition that there is anything objectionable (vis-à-vis 
authenticity) about the ordinary poseur: she wants to fit in with her friends, pretending to 
like basketball is a means to that end, and so she wisely pretends to like basketball.  She 
“conforms to the demands and expectations of others,” but she does so deliberately and 
knowingly.18  The internalized poseur, by contrast, seems like an unwitting dupe, whose 
conformity extends so far that she does not even know that she is conforming.   
Thus for some species of inauthenticity – existentialist “bad faith,” or the inauthenticity 
of the internalized poseur – it is more plausible that the disvalue of self-ignorance 
explains the disvalue of inauthenticity, and that the corresponding species of authenticity 
are valuable because self-knowledge is valuable.   
We can diagnose why these species of inauthenticity might seem especially objectionable 
to philosophers.  Consider what we might call the truth-directed intellectual virtues 
(which philosophers often defend as cardinal): sincerity and truthfulness (a disposition to 
speak the truth and not to mislead), accuracy (a disposition to inquire and to cleave to 
the evidence), and authenticity (understood as self-knowledge, or as requiring self-
knowledge).  Philosophers, lovers of truth, tend to be attracted to these virtues, and 
admire those who possess them.  Equally, they tend to be repulsed by their 
corresponding vices, and to despise those who possess them.  The person in “bad faith” 
and the internalized poseur are philosophers’ nightmares: insincere and ignorant.19 
                                                 
18 Cf. Feldman and Hazlett 2013, §2.   
19 If the value of authenticity derives from the value of self-knowledge, then we face a 
question of the species of value enjoyed by authenticity.  We have assumed so far that 
the value in question was eudaimonic value (§1.2), but if the value of authenticity derives 
from the value of self-knowledge, then perhaps authenticity enjoys what philosophers 
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In any event, on the existentialist conception of authenticity, it is not plausible that the 
value of authenticity explains the value of self-knowledge.   
5 Authenticity as spontaneity 
There is a species of authenticity that seems not to require self-knowledge, but rather to 
require self-ignorance.  Authenticity, on this conception, contrasts with a species of 
inauthenticity characterized by self-consciousness, and in particular self-knowledge of 
what one loves or cares about.  The corresponding species of authenticity is 
characterized by spontaneity, unselfconsciousness, and by the unreflective expression of 
what one loves or cares about.  This is a fourth possible answer to our question about 
the nature of authenticity.  We’ll first argue that authenticity, on this conception, requires 
self-ignorance (§5.1), and then consider three objections to our argument (§§5.2 – 5.4).  
We will conclude that the value of self-knowledge conflicts with the value of authenticity, 
on this conception.   
5.1  Self-knowledge and self-consciousness 
We need to say more about the species of authenticity we have in mind.  Consider self-
conscious Sam: 
Sam is stuck in a dead-end philosophy job in Boringtown, Connecticut.  
He has recently had a passionate affair with Grace, a visiting speaker from 
the exotic University of the Mediterranean. Grace has returned home and 
it’s unclear whether they’ll ever see each other again.  But Sam doesn’t 
want the romance to end.  He is tempted to skip town and join Grace at 
her seaside villa, but knows that this would be the last straw with the 
tenure committee at Boringtown State College, given his lackluster 
teaching evaluations and non-existent publication record.  So he reflects 
and introspects, trying to figure out what he cares about: Grace, his career, 
the romance of a spontaneous European tryst, and so on.  He makes a list 
of “pros” and “cons” for his various options; he ranks various 
counterfactual scenarios to get a picture of how his preferences stack up.  
Finally, after much self-investigation, he concludes “I am in love with 
Grace, therefore I shall go on a tryst,” and heads for the airport.   
Compare unselfconscious Sam: his story is the same, minus the self-investigation and 
minus the self-knowledge, but with the same resulting action.  Rather than making his 
romantic decision on the basis of self-knowledge, Sam makes his decision spontaneously, 
not knowing whether it is the right thing to do.  In virtue of this ignorance, 
unselfconscious Sam takes a romantic risk, while self-conscious Sam’s action is grounded 
in self-knowledge.   
We can imagine that both self-conscious Sam and unselfconscious Sam are in love with 
Grace, and that both are moved to act by their love.  Neither of their decisions is 
random or arbitrary.  They are both moved to act by what they care about (cf. §3).  The 
difference between them is that self-conscious Sam knows that he loves Grace, and as a 
                                                                                                                                           
call “epistemic” value – a domain of value having to do with truth, knowledge, and 
understanding, i.e. with “cognitive contact with reality” (Zagzebski 1996).  If the appeal 
of authenticity is explained by our appetite for the truth-directed intellectual virtues, then 
we might understand the value of authenticity as “epistemic” value. 
 17 
result knows (or is in a position to easily know) that his action is so moved.  Only he is 
knowingly moved to act by what he cares about.  Unselfconscious Sam’s romantic action is 
also based on what he cares about – this much we can see from our third-person 
perspective – but he doesn’t know that it is, since he doesn’t know that he loves Grace.   
We submit that unselfconscious Sam enjoys a species of intuitively appealing authenticity, 
which self-conscious Sam lacks.  The difference comes down (at least in part) to self-
knowledge: unselfconscious Sam lacks self-knowledge, while self-conscious Sam has self-
knowledge, and acts on its basis.  The relevant species of self-knowledge here is the same 
as that considered above (§3): knowledge of what you care about.  The actions of both 
characters express what matters most to them (§3); in this sense both are being true to 
themselves.  But unselfconscious Sam’s romantic decision is, in a different sense, more 
authentic than self-conscious Sam’s.  Unselfconscious Sam’s “true self” is manifested 
“naturally,” without the aid of conscious deliberation, whereas self-conscious Sam’s “true 
self” is manifested less directly, with the assistance of rational reflection.  Self-conscious 
Sam’s action is motivated by knowledge that he loves Grace; unselfconscious Sam’s 
action is motivated (only) by his love of Grace.  This is a difference between being 
motivated by a cognitive state of self-knowledge and being motivated (only) by a 
conative state of caring about another person.     
To put this another way, self-conscious Sam suffers from having “one thought too many.”  
Bernard Williams (1981) used this phrase to highlight the sense in which being motivated 
by impartial moral thinking is unappealing in the context of interpersonal relationships 
and other “ground projects.”  But the same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to self-
focused thinking in the context of interpersonal relationships and other “ground 
projects”: self-focused thinking is unappealing in these contexts.  In the case of self-
conscious Sam, self-knowledge interferes with a proper focus of his attention on Grace.  
His action seems less motivated by genuine romantic love for the other, and more by his 
self-directed concern.  There is a kind of genuine love, which self-conscious Sam seems 
not to have attained, that is not conceptualized as concerning oneself, but rather is 
wholly concerned with the other.20 
The point applies, however, not only to cases of interpersonal relationships.  Consider 
self-conscious Achilles, whose charge into battle is motivated by his knowledge that 
honor is what he loves most, and unselfconscious Achilles, whose charge into battle is 
motivated (only) by his love of honor.  Self-conscious Achilles’ last thought before battle 
is of himself; unselfconscious Achilles’ last thought before battle is of honor.  Or 
consider self-conscious Gandhi, whose hunger strike is motivated by his knowledge that 
freedom is what he loves most, and unselfconscious Gandhi, whose hunger strike is 
motivated (only) by his love of freedom.  Self-conscious Gandhi bases his actions on the 
thoughts about himself; unselfconscious Gandhi bases his actions on thoughts about 
freedom.   
                                                 
20 Our concern is not that Sam’s attention is focused on himself instead of on Grace, but 
that the addition of self-focus is unappealing in the romantic context.  Compare Williams’ 
argument: the worry about having “one thought too many” is not that one will not 
attend to one’s beloved, but that the additional presence of the “one thought too many” 
is unappealing.   
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There is a species of authenticity, then, that requires a lack of self-knowledge, in 
particular knowledge of what you love or care about.  Self-knowledge destroys 
authenticity, on this conception, because the person who knows herself, or who knows 
herself too well, is incapable of acting unselfconsciously, i.e. without self-knowledge.  
The extreme of authenticity, on this conception, is the person who is naturally and 
unreflectively true to herself, who does not think about herself, but simply “is herself,” 
always and without deliberation or reflection.  The extreme of inauthenticity, on this 
conception, is the person who is introspective, self-obsessed, and neurotically self-
concerned, who first figures out what action would best express her “true self,” and then 
acts.  But on the present conception of authenticity, such a person is doomed to fail: to 
“be yourself,” you cannot act on the basis of knowledge of what action would express 
your “true self.”  Anyone who acts on the basis of such self-knowledge is, ipso facto, 
inauthentic: she is faking it, pretending to “be herself,” acting like herself instead of being 
herself. 
The relevant species of self-knowledge (knowledge of what you love or care about) is 
incompatible with this species of authenticity (spontaneity).  The value of authenticity, on 
this conception, cannot explain the value of self-knowledge, because it conflicts with the 
value of (a species of) self-knowledge.   
5.2  Self-consciousness and self-inquiry  
Perhaps what is objectionable about self-conscious Sam isn’t his self-knowledge per se, 
but the inquiry that generates it.  So perhaps the species of authenticity he lacks doesn’t 
require self-ignorance, as we argued above (§3.1), but merely the virtuous refusal to seek 
self-knowledge.  Consider the case of confident Sam: he is just like self-conscious Sam, 
except that he enjoys self-knowledge (that he loves Grace) without self-examination, and 
bases his decision on that knowledge.  He doesn’t need to introspect or reflect on the 
question of whether he loves Grace, he just knows that he does.  On the present objection, 
it is self-conscious Sam who strikes us as lacking an appealing species of authenticity, 
which both confident Sam and unselfconscious Sam enjoy.   
We reply that maintaining the value of self-knowledge commits one to the value of self-
inquiry, as we assumed above (§1.4).  So if self-inquiry is disvaluable (as the present 
objection concedes), this puts the defender of the value of self-knowledge in a difficult 
position.  She must maintain the value of self-knowledge while discouraging its pursuit.  
We find this position unappealing, and conclude that the value of self-knowledge 
conflicts with the value of authenticity, on the present conception.   
5.3     Self-consciousness vs. mere self-knowledge 
Perhaps what is objectionable about self-conscious Sam isn’t his self-knowledge per se, 
but the fact that his self-knowledge is conscious or explicit.21  The species of authenticity 
he lacks doesn’t require self-ignorance, but rather a lack of conscious or explicit self-
knowledge.  Consider the case of intuitive Sam, who unconsciously or implicitly knows 
that he is in love with Grace, and bases his decision on that knowledge. On the present 
objection, it is self-conscious Sam who strikes us as lacking an appealing species of 
authenticity, which both intuitive Sam and unselfconscious Sam enjoy.   
                                                 
21 This might explain why self-inquiry is disvaluable, whilst self-knowledge is valuable, in 
virtue of the fact that inquiry is a deliberate activity that results in conscious or explicit 
knowledge, when successful.   
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We offer two replies to this objection.  First, inquiry is a deliberate activity that 
paradigmatically results in conscious or explicit knowledge, when successful.  So the 
defender of the present objection is again forced to say that self-knowledge is valuable 
whilst self-inquiry is disvaluable, which goes against our assumption that the value of 
self-knowledge commits one to the value of self-inquiry (§1.4).  Again, the value of self-
knowledge conflicts with the value of authenticity, on the present conception.   
Second, we are suspicious of the kind of unconscious or tacit knowledge posited by the 
present objection (cf. §3.1).  By hypothesis, unselfconscious Sam and intuitive Sam are 
both motivated, by their love of Grace, to perform the same action.  What role is being 
played by Sam’s unconscious or tacit self-knowledge?  It’s obscure what functional 
difference there is between someone’s caring about x and someone’s caring about x 
while unconsciously or tacitly knowing that she cares about x.  And if there is no 
functional difference and no phenomenological difference, we find it obscure whether 
there is any cognitive difference at all.   
5.4 Self-consciousness and motivation 
Perhaps what is objectionable about self-conscious Sam isn’t his self-knowledge per se, 
but the fact that he bases his decision on his knowledge that he loves Grace – and the 
same, mutatis mutandis, when it comes to confident Sam and intuitive Sam.  Compare 
spontaneous Sam, who is just like self-conscious Sam, but whose romantic action is not 
based on his knowledge that he loves Grace.  We might describe spontaneous Sam like 
this: he has the “one thought to many,” but that thought does not motivate his action.  
On the present objection, it is self-conscious Sam who strikes us as lacking an appealing 
species of authenticity, which both spontaneous Sam and unselfconscious Sam enjoy. 
We reply that self-knowledge of what you care about, for the authentic person, will 
always be disposed to motivate action.  We said that both self-conscious Sam and 
unselfconscious Sam are moved to act by their love – but there is an important 
motivational difference between them.  Someone can be moved to act by what she cares 
about in two importantly different ways.  Consider someone who cares about x, and is 
moved to act by this.  On the one hand, it might be the case that the only reason for 
which this person acts is the perceived value or importance of x.  However, on the other 
hand, it might be the case that among the reasons for which this person acts is the fact 
that she cares about x.  This is the sort of motivational profile that self-conscious Sam 
enjoys.  On the present objection, the authentic person, who cares about x, will base her 
actions only on the value or importance of x, and will not base her actions on the fact 
that she cares about x.  This is why, on the present proposal, authenticity does not 
require self-ignorance, but merely that self-knowledge (in certain cases) be motivationally 
impotent. 
However, to what extent is it possible for self-knowledge of what you care about to 
remain motivationally impotent, for the authentic person?  To what extent it is possible 
for someone to act, spontaneously, on the basis of the value or importance of x, whilst 
knowing that she cares about x, without basing her action on the fact that she cares 
about x?  We submit that the authentic person will struggle to resist the motivational 
influence of such self-knowledge.  Knowledge of what you care about, like desire, is 
characteristically motivational.  The evidence for this is the fact that cases of ennui – “I 
know I care about my kids, but I just feel indifferent right now” – are exceptional.  So 
while it may be the case that authenticity, on the present conception, is compatible with 
self-knowledge, we can expect a reliable correlation between self-knowledge and 
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inauthenticity.  The policy of seeking self-knowledge (§2.2) will not be generally reliable 
vis-à-vis authenticity.  And thus the value of self-knowledge conflicts with the value of 
authenticity, on the present conception.   
Compare, again, Williams’ worry about impartial moral thinking.  The idea there is that 
your wife would have a complaint if you were to confess that the reason you saved her 
was that it was your impartial moral duty.  Suppose, instead, that you were to insist that 
while you knew that saving her was your impartial moral duty, this was not a reason for 
which you acted.  One reason this sounds implausible, we propose, is that once one 
knows that one has a reason to , it is difficult to avoid this reason becoming a reason 
for which you  (if indeed you ).  It is difficult to recognize a reason and then to quell 
its motivational force.  We can expect a reliable correlation between impartial thinking 
and impartial motivation.   
6 Conclusion 
We have considered four species of authenticity: 
 Avoiding pretense (§2) 
 Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (§3) 
 Existential self-knowledge (§4) 
 Spontaneity (§5) 
We have argued that for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity 
does not explain the value of (the relevant species of) self-knowledge.  The relationship 
between authenticity and self-knowledge seems, in each case, not to be straightforward, 
and in no case is an explanation of the value of self-knowledge, that appeals to the value 
of authenticity, plausible.  Moreover, we propose that a certain species of self-ignorance 
may actually be necessary for authenticity, understood as spontaneity.  We conclude that 
Lynch’s suggestion, to explain the value of self-knowledge by appeal to the value of 
authenticity, is not promising.22   
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